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THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE: ANTIABORTION MODERATES
AFTER ROE V. WADE, 1973-1980
MARY ZIEGLER*
INTRODUCTION
Did Roe v. Wade destroy the possibility for compromise in the
abortion debate? Leading studies argue that Roe itself radicalized de-
bate and marginalized antiabortion moderates, either by issuing a
sweeping decision before adequate public support had developed or
by framing the opinion in terms of moral absolutes.1 Others rely on this
history in criticizing the sweeping privacy framework set out in Roe,
attributing the radicalization of the general discussion and the antia-
bortion movement to the timing, reach, or framing of the abortion right
in the opinion.2
* Mary Ziegler is an assistant professor at St. Louis University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, Birth Control, Population Control, and Family Planning: An
Overview, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 14-16 (Don-
ald T. Critchlow ed., 1996) (arguing that Roe "only intensified, although unintentionally, growing
polarization on the [abortion] issue," that Roe "activated pro-life opposition," and that Roe ren-
dered "[s]erious moral dialogue and political compromise... more difficult"); LINDA GORDON, THE
MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 300, 319 (3d ed. 2002)
(arguing that political divisions and absolutist divisions in the abortion debate stem from broad
disagreements about social values related to sex and reproduction and asserting that that abso-
lutist divisions remain stable and tenacious); ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF
VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? 161 (1993). By contrast, Celeste Michelle Condit has argued that
Roe represented a form of legal compromise between competing rhetorical frames, and she sug-
gests that the media, too, has adopted elements of both pro- and anti-abortion strategies. See
CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE 117, 141,
201-03 (1990). Mark Graber has also been critical of the prevailing idea that compromise in the
contemporary abortion debate is impossible. See MARK GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL
CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 17, 20-38 (1999). For his part, Gene Burns
argues that, before Roe, the abortion debate had reached an impasse at which compromise was
impossible, and he attributes this result to the rhetorical frames each movement endorsed, not to
the Supreme Court's decision. See GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION,
AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 310 (2005).
2. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 242 (2010); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 114 (1999); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 381-82 (1985); Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive justice:
De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1394-96 (2009).
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The polarization narrative on which leading studies rely obscures
important actors and arguments that defined the antiabortion move-
ment of the 1970s. First, contrary to what the polarization narrative
suggests, self-identified antiabortion moderates played a significant
role in the mainstream antiabortion movement. As we shall see, activ-
ists like Warren Schaller and Marjory Mecklenburg assumed positions
of leadership in the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), then the
largest national antiabortion organization and a clearinghouse for
strategy for the wide variety of groups active at the state level. These
activists shaped the mainstream movement's policies on issues like the
treatment of unwed mothers or the Equal Rights Amendment. During
testimony about a human life amendment to the Constitution, they
helped to forge the movement's public-relations strategy.
Second, because of the influence exercised by these activists, post-
Roe compromise in the 1970s was more possible than is conventional-
ly thought, especially on issues beyond abortion itself. Working in or-
ganizations like Feminists for Life (FFL) or American Citizens
Concerned for Life (ACCL), antiabortion moderates campaigned for
what they defined to be alternatives to abortion: for example, laws
prohibiting pregnancy discrimination or funding contraception or sex
education. Roe did not undo these important opportunities for com-
promise.
Ultimately, however, for several reasons, moderates lost influence.
First, in the mid-1970s, as part of their campaign against the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), conservative women's groups like Phyllis
Schlafly's STOP ERA took up the abortion issue. In order to persuade
abortion opponents to condemn the Amendment, Schlafly and her al-
lies began stressing that the Amendment would make Roe v. Wade a
permanent constitutional fact. Similarly, Schlafly and her allies con-
tended that feminism was and always would be pro-abortion. The in-
volvement of antifeminist groups in the abortion debate helped to
convince activists otherwise supportive of or indifferent to the ERA
that no part of the feminist agenda was deserving of support. Moreo-
ver, Schlafly and a newer group, Beverly LaHaye's Concerned Women
for America (CWA), identified and mobilized a cohort of women op-
posed to both abortion and the ERA.
Similarly, in the late 1970s, for strategic reasons, both the wom-
en's movement and the antiabortion movement began marginalizing
activists opposed to abortion but supportive of the ERA or anti-
pregnancy discrimination legislation. For the National Right to Life
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Committee or other mainstream antiabortion groups, the Religious
Right and New Right, both of which were becoming politically power-
ful in the late 1970s and both of which had members strongly opposed
to abortion, appeared to be attractive allies. In the same period, as
abortion-rights groups increasingly stressed that the antiabortion
movement was intent on oppressing women, antiabortion moderates
also lost any place they might have had on the political left.
The history of antiabortion moderates complicates leading criti-
cisms of Roe that rely on the polarization produced by the decision.
Arguing that Roe sidelined moderates, scholars criticize the sweep of
the opinion, the privacy rationale it offers, or the timing of its issuance
in a period in which the abortion issue was very much alive in state
legislatures. However, to the extent that the history of antiabortion
moderates offers an example, Roe did not polarize discussion. If Roe
did not sideline antiabortion moderates, could it be properly said to
have created a clash of absolutes? If Roe did not polarize debate, then
should criticisms of the opinion's rationale, timing, or scope be reex-
amined? The history here makes more urgent a reconsideration of
these questions.
The history considered here also offers new perspective on an in-
creasingly rich scholarship on women of the Right. Scholars like Sarah
Barringer Gordon and Donald Critchlow have studied the emergence,
evolution, and strategies of organizations like Phyllis Schlafly's STOP
ERA and Beverly LaHaye's Concerned Women for America.3 Although
strongly opposed to second-wave feminism, these groups argued that
they were redeeming the essence of womanhood from feminists. These
studies have not fully done justice to important "pro-woman" antiabor-
tion activists in groups like the NRLC, ACCL, and FFL. Unlike the mem-
bers of the CWA or STOP ERA, these activists identified with second-
wave feminism or defined themselves partly by a willingness to form
alliances with feminists. These moderate activists have largely been
lost in the current history of both the abortion debate and of women of
the Right.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I studies the influence of
self-described antiabortion moderates on the mainstream antiabortion
3. See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN'S
CRUSADE (2005); CAROL FELSENTHAL, THE SWEETHEART OF THE SILENT MAJORITY: THE BIOGRAPHY OF
PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY (1981); see generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS
VOICES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA (2010); REBECCA E. KLATCH, WOMEN OF THE NEW
RIGHT (1987); CATHERINE E. RYMPH, REPUBLICAN WOMEN: FEMINISM AND CONSERVATISM FROM SUFFRAGE
THROUGH THE RISE OF THE NEW RIGHT (2006).
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movement between 1973 and 1975. Part II examines the role played in
the abortion debate of the 1970s by the freestanding organizations
these activists formed. Part III shows that these groups were marginal-
ized not simply because of Roe, but because of a wide variety of factors,
including the rise of the New Right and the evolution of the ERA battle.
The final part briefly concludes.
I. WOMEN's RIGHTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ABORTION: ANTIABORTION
RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
A wide variety of antiabortion leaders held liberal or moderate
views on some social issues. For example, the United States Catholic
Conference's Family Life Division, the group that spawned many sub-
sequent organizations, was run throughout the 1970s by Monsignor
James McHugh, who became known for his endorsement of sex educa-
tion in public schoolS.4 Similarly, Americans United for Life, a group
originally formed by conservative Catholics displeased with Monsignor
McHugh, had splintered because moderate members had led a vote
refusing to oppose the use of certain forms of contraception, prompt-
ing an exodus by more absolutist members like Notre Dame Professor
Charles Rice.s
However, the most telling evidence of the influence of antiabor-
tion moderates may be found in the history of the largest national anti-
abortion organization, the NRLC. From the outset, the organization's
leadership had a wide range of views on contraception, feminism, and
sex education. More conservative Catholic members like Randy Engel,
the founder of another organization, the United States Coalition for Life
(USCL), held the view that support for sex education had ultimately led
to the legalization of abortion.6 Others were like Dr. Frederick Meck-
4. For McHugh's stand on the desirability of public-school sex education, see, for example,
SEx EDUCATION: A GUIDE FOR TEACHERS (Rev. James T. McHugh ed., 1969). On the founding of the
NRLC, see, for example, Keith Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement: Sources, Development, and
Strategies, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 128, 140
(Donald T. Critchlow ed., 1996); MARY JO WEAVER & R. SCorT APPLEBY, BEING RIGHT: CONSERVATIVE
CATHOLICS IN AMERICA 273 (1995).
5. See Julie Grismstead, "Profound Obligation, Highest Privilege": Dr. Joseph R. Stanton and
the Prolife Movement 131-38 (Feb. 20, 1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author);
Letter from Charles E. Rice, professor of law, Notre Dame Law School, to George Hunston Wil-
liams, professor, Harvard Divinity School (Feb. 10, 1972) (on file with author); Meeting Minutes,
Americans United for Life, 4, 6-7 (Mar. 10-11, 1972) (Executive File, Folder 91, Concordia Histor-
ical Institute of the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod).
6. Engel argued that the "Sangerite movement," one she believed supported population
control, contraception, and abortion, had "come full circle following the Supreme Court decision
on abortion." Abortion Part Ill: Hearing on S.j. Res. 119 and S.]. Res. 130 Before the Subcommittee on
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lenburg, a member of the American Association of Planned Parenthood
Physicians and the founder of a family planning clinic at the University
of Minnesota.7 His wife, Marjory, also supported the availability of legal
contraception.8
This diversity notwithstanding, it was the Mecklenburgs and their
supporters who successfully promoted the idea of creating a separate
and secular national organization opposed to abortion.9 The influence
of this moderate faction continued after the organization became inde-
pendent from the Catholic Church. Because she had attracted an influ-
ential group of supporters, Marjory Mecklenburg was elected chairman
of the organization.lo
In the face of considerable opposition, the Mecklenburg faction al-
so imposed its choice of interim Executive Director, Warren Schaller,
an Episcopal minister from St. Paul, Minnesota, on the organization.l
Later disagreements about Schaller's leadership reflected deeper divi-
sions about how the organization should be run. Mecklenburg and her
allies wanted the NRLC to take a stand more often on issues related to
abortion, such as family planning or forced sterilization.12 For the most
part, members of the Mecklenburg faction supported or at least ac-
cepted broad access to family planning services, as well as publicly-
funded daycare.13 Finally, reversing an earlier position, the faction
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 93d Cong. 98 (1974) (statement of
Randy Engel, director, U.S. Coalition for Life).
7. See Frederick Mecklenburg, Biographical Information (c. 1975), in The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers (Box 17, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
8. See, e.g., Abortion-Part IV: Hearings on S.]. Res. 6, S.]. Res. 10 and 11, and S.]. Res. 91
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 94th
Cong. 660 (1976) (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg, President, American Citizens Concerned
for Life).
9. See Robert N. Karrer, The Formation of Michigan's Anti-abortion Movement, 1967-1974,
22 MICH. HIST. REV. 67,98 (1996).
10. See Arlene Doyle, Do You Need Permission to Save an Unborn Baby?, in U.S. COALITION FOR
LIFE 1, 9 (1977), available at http://uscl.info/edoc/doc.php?docid=88&action=inline (on Meck-
lenburg's role as Chairman).
11. See id. at 11.
12. See The Owl in the Saguaro (Feb. 1974), in the American Citizens Concerned for Life
Papers (Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
13. See, e.g., Frederick Mecklenburg, Building Bridges Instead of Walls (1975), in The Ameri-
can Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 14, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of
Michigan); Letter from Judy Fink to Edward Golden et al. (Jun. 1973), in the American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers (Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan); Judy
Fink, Policy Statement of the NRLC Concerning Birth Control" (May 15, 1973), in The American
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan)
[hereinafter Fink, Policy Statement] (proposing that the NRLC endorse "the pill" and IUDs in order
to guarantee, among other things, "the participation of... 12 million Southern Baptists").
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endorsed an open-ended, decentralized, participatory model of deci-
sion-making.14
Between June 1973 and October 1974, with Schaller's help, the
Mecklenburg faction played an important role in shaping the structure,
public image, priorities, and decisions of the NRLC. The first important
development involved the group's daily operations and structure.is
Throughout much of 1973, Marjory Mecklenburg successfully pro-
posed and promoted a system whereby everyone on the NRLC's Execu-
tive Committee had "[flreedom ... to take some initiative in particular
areas to get things done."16
The structure she endorsed was closely tied to her vision of "pro-
life activism." Because of her influence, between 1973 and 1974, the
NRLC endorsed a number of goals beyond abortion, including demands
for the fair treatment of unwed mothers.17 Moreover, in part because
of the impact of Mecklenburg and her supporters, the NRLC did not
come out against the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) until 1977, vot-
ing in 1975 against a resolution critical of the Amendment.18 Both of
these policies offended conservatives within the organization.19 That
the Mecklenburg wing was able to exert such an influence is telling.
One important incident began when Judy Fink and Mecklenburg
expressed anger at a recent program adopted by the Girl Scouts, called
"To Be a Woman."20 Mecklenburg and Fink voiced concern that it gave
a misleading and destructive view of womanhood and feminism. In
particular, they were outraged that participating Girl Scouts were obli-
gated to visit an abortion cliniC.21 The pair demanded that the NRLC
oppose the program and offer a countervailing view of womanhood
and women's rights.
14. See Letter from Marjory Mecklenburg to the NRLC Executive Committee (Aug. 16, 1973),




17. See, e.g., Resolution 3 (Jul. 1974), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers
(Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
18. See NRLC Board Meeting Minutes (Sep. 20-21, 1975), in The American Citizens Con-
cerned for Life Papers (Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
19. See, e.g., Letter from Randy Engel to the NLRC Board of Directors et al. (Mar. 30, 1974), in
The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, Universi-
ty of Michigan) (objecting to the Mecklenburgs' position on contraception).
20. See Letter from Judy Fink to the NRLC Executive Committee (Jul. 1, 1973), in The Ameri-
can Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michi-
gan).
21. See id.; see also NRLC Board Meeting Minutes (June 29-30, 1973), in The American Citi-
zens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
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Fink also raised a related, high-profile incident involving the in-
voluntary sterilization of two African American teenagers in Ala-
bama.22 Fink argued that the NRLC should itself develop an argument
about "rights to choose," opposing coercion in the context of reproduc-
tive decisions.23 Neither effort resulted in a major public education
campaign on the part of the organization. Instead, and perhaps more
significantly, Mecklenburg's allies voted in favor of the creation of a
Policy Committee designed to address and announce "pro-life" views
on matters beyond the ratification of a human life amendment.24 The
creation of the Committee dovetailed nicely with one goal of moderate
antiabortion advocates in the NRLC: these activists hoped to show that
interest in protecting life reached beyond the Catholic Church and be-
yond the issue of abortion.25
Antiabortion moderates did spark controversy in the broader
movement. Randy Engel, an influential opponent of population control
from Pennsylvania, and Carolyn Gerster, a prominent Arizona activist,
pressed for condemnation of Planned Parenthood as a whole, as well
as criticism of supposedly "abortive" forms of contraception, like pros-
taglandins and the IUD.26 For the moderates, persuading the organiza-
tion to remain silent on these issues represented a significant victory.27
By the end of 1974, however, prominent moderates left the organ-
ization partly because of the bitter divisions that consumed it. Howev-
er, as we shall see, Mecklenburg and Fink did not leave because of a
significant decline in support for moderate positions. The immediate
catalyst for their departure involved a dramatic loss of financial sup-
port.28
However, in spite of the funding crisis, Mecklenburg and the mod-
erates retained influence over the organization. Schaller played an
important role in framing the organization's public-relations strategy
22. See Bill Kovach, Sterilization Consent Not Given, Father Tells Kennedy's Panel, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 1973, at 16; Expand Sterilization Suit, CHI. DEFENDER., Aug. 14, 1973, at 4.
23. See Fink to NRLC Executive Committee, supra note 20; Fink, Policy Statement, supra note
13.
24. See NRLC Board Meeting Minutes, supra note 21.
25. See Fink to NRLC Executive Committee, supra note 20; Fink, Policy Statement, supra note
13.
26. See Engel to NRLC Board of Directors, supra note 19.
27. The NRLC has not until present taken an official position on contraception. See William
Saletan, Rubber-Baby Money Lumpers: The Pro-Life Movement's Contraception Problem, SLATE, Aug.
3, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2224154/.
28. See, e.g., Letter from Frances Frech to Marjory Mecklenburg (Oct. 25, 1973), in The Amer-




during congressional testimony about a human life amendment. In
February 1974, Schaller contended that the organization should em-
phasize medical arguments and should stress the religious diversity of
the antiabortion movement.29 In March, the leaders of the organization
agreed, arguing for a broader focus on "Protestant, Lutheran, Mormon,
and Jewish testimony."3o
Indeed, as late as June 1974, the NRLC continued to pass relatively
liberal resolutions. Two major policy statements issued by the organi-
zation at that time took up Mecklenburg's arguments about alterna-
tives to abortion and antiabortion feminism. One proposed that
antiabortion advocates work to remove the stigma attached to unwed
motherhood.31 If single women could act as mothers without fear of
condemnation, as the resolution reasoned, there would be less need for
abortion. Another resolution provided that antiabortion women, not
members of NOW, truly spoke for women's rights: women exercised
their own civil rights, the resolution argued, "by campaigning... for
the enactment of an amendment to protect the civil right to life of all
defenseless life and ... for the affirmation of a pro-life ethic consistent
with a truly liberated feminine role."32
As these resolutions suggested, Mecklenburg had maintained
strong support. Moreover, as we shall see, moderates remained influ-
ential within the antiabortion movement even after the departure of
Mecklenburg and Fink.
II. BEYOND ABORTION: THE INFLUENCE OF THE ACCL AND FFL, 1974-78
When Fink and Mecklenburg left the NRLC, they revived a more
openly liberal antiabortion organization, American Citizens Concerned
for Life (ACCL), a national expansion of Mecklenburg's Minnesota
group. The group at first appears to be small and relatively short-lived:
founded prior to Roe, active beginning in 1974, and no longer function-
ing by the mid-1980s.33 However, the ACCL itself was more influential
in the late 1970s than might be expected. As this Article will demon-
strate, the organization's philosophy held that fetal rights could be
29. See Letter from Warren Schaller to the NRLC (Feb. 25, 1974), in The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers (Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
30. See NRLC Meeting Minutes (Mar. 15-16, 1974), in The American Citizens Concerned for
Life Papers (Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
31. See Resolution 3, supra note 17, at 1.
32. See Resolution 4 (June 1974), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 8,
Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
33. See, e.g., MENSCH & FREEMAN, supra note 1, at 138.
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protected only if women were themselves guaranteed better legal and
economic opportunities.
Members of the Mecklenburg faction began expressing this view
more openly after their formal break with the NRLC. In 1975, when
many antiabortion moderates had left the NRLC or had registered their
dissent, Frederick Mecklenburg, a leader of the ACCL, issued an in-
dictment of the mainstream antiabortion movement: "On the subject of
building walls, if we persist in avoiding and rejecting the help of con-
cerned citizens who may promote sex education or family planning or
welfare programs, to support the unwed, we deserve to be left frus-
trated and angry."34
Dr. Mecklenburg laid out one vision of the moderates' philosophy:
the only way to protect fetal rights was to "work harder than ever to
make abortion unnecessary."3s One way to achieve this goal concerned
women who already had children: "more medical assistance for the
unwed mother and her baby, programs to keep pregnant girls in
school, and... provision for daycare centers and training."36 A second
and equally important set of proposals involved women's rights to
prevent pregnancy.37 In 1974, in her congressional testimony, Marjory
Mecklenburg stressed a similar point, arguing that government should
"treat pregnant women, wed or unwed, with some dignity and respect
their rights" but "not at the expense of... children."38 In short, as
Mecklenburg argued, the ACCL took the position that "[a]ll these rights
need to be balanced."39
Several developments in the mid-1970s allowed the ACCL to pro-
mote this vision effectively. The first was the 1976 presidential race.
The NRLC had limited its role in the campaign, citing its tax-exempt
status in deciding not to endorse or campaign heavily for any candi-
date, including Ronald Reagan and Ellen McCormack, who both sup-
ported a human life amendment.4o By contrast, Marjory Mecklenburg
and the ACCL campaigned for Gerald Ford, petitioning various antia-




38. Abortion Hearings-Part IV, supra note 8, at 643-53 (arguing for several measures,
including publicly funded contraception and "daycare facilities [as] an important alternative to
abortion").
39. Id. at 644.
40. See Judy Klemesrud, Abortion in the Campaign: Methodist Surgeon Leads the Opposition,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1976, at 28 (explaining NRLC's position on the 1976 election).
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bortion organizations for support.41 She even served as a kind of in-
house counsel, advising Ford on how best to approach antiabortion
Americans.42
After the election, Marjory Mecklenburg and the ACCL found
themselves in an equally advantageous position. President Jimmy
Carter came into office seeking a compromise solution on abortion.
The reasons for this were complex. The passage of Medicaid funding
restrictions (commonly known as the Hyde Amendment) in 1976 be-
gan a series of battles in Congress about the scope of restrictions on
the Medicaid funding of abortion, struggles so intense that Congress
found itself repeatedly gridlocked and unable to pass major appropria-
tions legislation.43 In such an environment, compromise in and of itself
was appealing.
Moreover, in his Administration and more generally, Carter hoped
to attract and appease both women's-rights supporters and opponents
of abortion. The divisions within the Administration in this regard
were stark: the head of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare under Carter, Joseph Califano, was a vocal opponent of abortion
rights, while Sarah Weddington, a former leader of NARAL, served as
general counsel for the Department of Agriculture.44 Carter portrayed
himself as a religious Christian and, by opposing some forms of abor-
tion rights, hoped to create or maintain support among evangelical
Protestants during his first term in office.45 At the same time, by de-
claring the celebration of International Women's Year and support for
the ERA, Carter hoped to court women in general and feminists in par-
ticular.46
The compromise settled on by the Carter Administration involved
the kinds of legislation long promoted by the ACCL: Carter supported
restrictions on the use of Medicaid for abortion while demanding
greater funding for sex education and family planning, especially for
41. See, e.g., ROBERT MASON, RICHARD NIXON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW MAJORITY 230 (2004).
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Marjorie Hunter, Congress Approves an Abortion Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1979, at 10; James Strong, Thousands of Workers Face Pay Delay on Abortion Fight, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
8, 1977, § 1, at 3.
44. For Califano's account of his position, see JOSEPH CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA 64-65
(2007). On the appointment of Weddington, see Douglas Frantz, Carter Hit on Hiring of Abortion
Backer, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 9, 1978, § 1, at 12..
45, See, e.g., Maxwell Glen, The Electronic Ministers Listen to the Gospel According to the
Candidates, NAT'L J., Dec. 22, 1979, at 2142, 2145; Gary Willis,'Born Again'Politics, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Aug. 1, 1976, at 8-9.




juvenileS.47 The focus on juveniles came because of a series of reports,
released by both Planned Parenthood's Guttmacher Institute and by
university researchers, highlighting a hike in the rate of pregnancy for
unwed white and black teenagers.48
In campaigning for and testifying on behalf of the so-called Ado-
lescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1978, Marjory
Mecklenburg made the ACCL the public face of compromise in the de-
bate. Testifying before Congress, she portrayed her organization and
its position as the only one that enjoyed popular support. She pointed
out that there was popular support for using "tax money to
help... pregnant women with services," while there was no such sup-
port for publicly-funded abortions.49 She described her position as a
politically appealing one, a stance "on which people who differ on the
questions of abortion legality or abortion funding should be able to
agree."so
The passage of the Act was an important victory for antiabortion
liberals. Debate about the Act also made Mecklenburg herself more
prominent: Carter considered making her a part of his Administration
but declined to do so primarily because she was too publicly known as
an opponent of abortion.s5
The ACCL's influence was also apparent in the public response to
the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in General Electric Company v. Gil-
bert. In Gilbert, the Court had held that the systematic exclusion of
pregnancy from disability coverage was not, under Title VII, sex dis-
crimination.52 In doing so, the Court effectively barred any pregnancy-
discrimination claim, since an earlier decision, Geduldig v. Aiello, had
held that pregnancy discrimination was constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53
Gilbert almost immediately produced outrage: a coalition of labor
and feminist leaders formed an organization designed to undo Gilbert
47. On Carter's position, see, for example, Calls For Sex Education: Abortion No, Family Plan-
ning Yes: Califano, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1977, § 1, at 6.
48. See Rising Concern Over Surge in Illegitimacy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 26, 1978, at
59.
49. Adolescent Health, Services, and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act of 1978: Hearings on S.
2910 Before the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 431 (1978) (statement of Marjory Mecklen-
burg, President, American Citizens Concerned for Life).
50. Id.
51. See From Reject to Boss, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 1, 1981, at 38.
52. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138-140, 146 (1976).
53. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494,496-97, 496 n.20 (1974).
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and its effects.54 Although not part of that coalition, the ACCL was
equally vocal in condemning Gilbert. The ACCL suggested that Gilbert
encouraged abortion and also denied "protection and economic equali-
ty to pregnant women."ss Gilbert was also said to violate fetal rights in
part because it deprived women of the ability to make important re-
productive decisions: faced with the choice of a loss of her job, a wom-
an's willingness to seek abortion could "not be said to be the product of
free choice but rather of coercion."56
An earlier press release made the point even more clearly. The
statement described Gilbert as "intolerable to people who value human
life and want to protect it."57 However, as the ACCL put it, the decision
was equally offensive because it failed to "protect the right of the
woman to give birth without suffering discrimination."s8 As it had in
the context of adolescent pregnancy prevention, the ACCL positioned
itself as a reasonable antiabortion organization with which a variety of
abortion advocacy groups could work.
In the 1970s, some antiabortion groups did find the ACCL's posi-
tion to be controversial. Other antiabortion groups took the position
that many family-planning methods were tantamount to abortion.59 By
1978, Judie Brown, then-Executive Director of the NRLC, opposed the
Carter plan on adolescent pregnancy, arguing that sex education and
contraception led to teenage pregnancies instead of preventing them.60
Nonetheless, in the 1970s, the efforts of the ACCL reflected interest
among a significant segment of the antiabortion community in protect-
ing both the rights of women and the rights of fetuses.
FFL charted a similar course in the 1970s. Between 1972 and
1974, new members from forty states joined the organization.61 By
54. See, e.g., Feminist Leaders Plan Coalition for Law Aiding Pregnant Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1976, at 40.
55. See Press Release, ACCL (Apr. 29, 1977), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life
Papers (Box 17, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
56. Id.
57. Press Release, Judy Fink, Pro-Life Group Says General Electric Corp. 'Encourages Abor-
tions' in Gilbert Case (Mar. 15, 1977), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 17,
Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
58. See id.
59. As early as 1973, Nellie Gray, leader of March for Life, took the position that a mandatory
human life amendment would have to ban any form of "abortifacient" contraception. See Nellie
Gray, A Mandatory "Human Life Amendment", (Sept 24, 1973), in The American Citizens Con-
cerned for Life Papers (Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
60. Susan Fraker, Abortion Under Attack, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1978, at 36, 47.
61. See Abortion-Part Il/: Hearing on S.]. Res. 199 and S.]. Res. 130 Before the Subcommittee




contrast to the ACCL, Feminists for Life presented its mission not as an
effort to balance the rights of women and fetuses, but rather as an at-
tempt to redeem and fulfill the promise of second-wave feminism. In
1973, in an anthology of antiabortion feminist writings, Goltz attacked
antifeminists and abortion opponents who had criticized the Equal
Rights Amendment.62 There, Goltz argued that the Amendment would
not expand access to abortion because abortion did not at all promote
sex equality.63
In 1974, in testifying before Congress, Goltz elaborated on this ar-
gument. First, she contended that abortion was not consistent with
feminist ideology: "We are demanding an end to class stereotyping for
women; we cannot and dare not introduce a new class stereotype
based on age, mental and physical condition or degree of
unwantedness."64 Abortion, as Goltz saw it, was a concession that
women did not demand "the right to be treated as equals and to be
mothers at the same time."65
The experience of Goltz and other leaders of FFL in the late 1970s
was emblematic of the increasing isolation and rejection encountered
by antiabortion moderates in the late 1970s. In the mid-1970s, Goltz
almost obsessively chronicled the rejection of pro-life women from
feminist groups.66
By 1977, the antiabortion movement had done much to isolate
Goltz and her supporters. That year, the heads of most mainstream
national antiabortion organizations attended an event held by Phyllis
Schlafly, the head of the nation's leading anti-feminist and anti-ERA
organization. Since 1975, Schlafly had been the key proponent of ar-
guments that the ERA would promote abortion, a claim that Goltz had
fought desperately to refute.67 Yet at an anti-feminist rally in 1977,
Goltz watched as virtually every leading mainstream antiabortion
woman took the stage and denounced both feminism and the ERA.68.
The 1981 NRLC Convention made apparent that the antiabortion
movement had left groups like FFL and the ACCL behind. Jerry Falwell,
62. See Pat Goltz, Equal Rights, in PRO-LIFE FEMINISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY 224, 224-27
(Mary Krane Derr et al. eds., Feminism & Nonviolence Studies Ass'n, 2005) (1995).
63. See id.
64. Abortion-Part Ill, supra note 61, at 108.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 116.
67. For a study of Schlafly, see generally CRITCHLow, supra note 3.
68. See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, ERA's Assist to Abortion, THE PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REPORT (Oct.




a well-known televangelist, social conservative, and the head of the
Moral Majority, had a prominent place at the event.69 Moderates felt
considerably more marginalized. Rosemary Bottcher of FFL stated that,
when dealing with the new leadership of the antiabortion movement,
her group would have to "hold [their] noses."70 Part III next considers
why activists found themselves sidelined by the end of the decade.
III. MARGINALIZING THE MODERATES, 1975-1980
There were several reasons for the marginalization of antiabor-
tion moderates. One was the increased involvement of antifeminist
groups in the abortion debate. The leading antifeminist group in the
1970s, Phyllis Schlafly's STOP ERA, began in 1972, when Schlafly, a
former congressional candidate and long-term conservative activist,
called a meeting of supporters at the O'Hare Airport Inn.71 The same
year, STOP ERA held its first national meeting in St. Louis, operating
thereafter as a loose collection of organizations opposed to the
Amendment.72
In the early 1970s, STOP ERA differed considerably from groups
like FFL and the ACCL. STOP ERA members argued that feminists in-
tended to destroy all the privileges women enjoyed and all of the traits
that made women valuable and different from men.73 By contrast,
members of FFL and the ACCL viewed women as victims of discrimina-
tion at work, at school, and in abortion clinicS.74 Members of both FFL
and the ACCL saw some aspects of the second-wave feminist agenda as
valuable, pro-woman, and compatible with opposition to abortion.75
To be pro-woman, as these groups argued, was to acknowledge that
abortion entrenched rather than alleviated discrimination.
These differences were not entirely apparent in 1973-1975, since
Schlafly had not yet addressed the relationship between abortion and
the ERA. Schlafly had several reasons for ignoring the abortion ques-
tion. First, most of Schlafly's supporters were evangelical Protestants,
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. CRITCHLOW, supra note 3, at 219.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 221-23.
74. The ACCL's support for bans on pregnancy discrimination reflected this point of view.
See supra notes 55, 57, and text accompanying. Feminists for Life, under Pat Goltz, attributed the
need for abortion to sex discrimination. See Abortion-Part III, supra note 61, at 108.
75. See Goltz, supra note 62, at 224-28 (describing Goltz's support for the ERA); Abortion




and in the early 1970s, abortion was viewed as a Catholic issue.76 Many
of Schlafly's supporters might have been expected to oppose Catholi-
cism as much as abortion.77
As importantly, the issue of abortion did not as obviously fit in
with Schlafly's core argument: that feminists and the ERA would harm
traditional homemakers.78 Over time, it would become clear that
Schlafly's core supporters-often young, evangelical women-opposed
abortion for the same reasons they opposed the ERA.79
In the early 1970s, antiabortion groups were willing to support or
at least live with the Amendment for different reasons. Some, like
Goltz, supported the ERA.8o Others believed strongly that the antiabor-
tion movement should focus on only one issue.81 However, by the mid-
1970s, Schlafly and STOP ERA began publicizing abortion-based argu-
ments against the ERA. In 1977, for example, she asserted: "The wom-
en's libbers expect ERA to be the constitutional means to assure and
make permanent their goal of unlimited abortion on demand."82 She
suggested that the ERA would require the public funding of abortion,
teaching and counseling about it in public schools, and the denial of tax
exemptions to churches that opposed it.83 She stressed that "[t]he
women's libbers believe[d that] the greatest 'inequality' between men
and women" was the fact that "women get pregnant and men do not."84
As abortion opponents became convinced that both the ERA and
feminism were pro-abortion, groups like the NRLC began to condemn
both in equal measure. This shift began to be apparent 1975. Part of
this was due to the celebration of International Women's Year (IWY),
76. See CRITCHLOW, supra note 3, at 220.
77. At least as recently as 1960, anti-Catholic sentiment was believed to have cost John F.
Kennedy the Evangelical vote. See MARK A. NOLL, RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM THE
COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980s 375 (1990). Evangelical-Catholic relations improved in 1970. See
RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970s 37 (Bruce Shulman & Julian Zelizer
eds., 2008). In 1974, even antiabortion activists were worried that abortion was still viewed as a
sectarian Catholic issue. See, e.g., Letter from Warren Schaller to the NRLC (Oct. 1974), in The
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of
Michigan) ("Last week, Arlie Schardt of the Washington ACLU was stating that [the] NRLC is
Catholic dominated ... This kind of press will be hard to counteract.").
78. Phyllis Schlafly, The Fraud Called the ERA, THE PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REPORT 1 (May 1972), in
The Phyllis Schlafly Report Collection (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
79. See CRITCHLOW, supra note 3, at 221.
80. See GOLTZ, supra note 62, at 224-28.
81. See Carol A. Stabile, The Traffick in Fetuses, in FETAL SUBJECTS, FEMINIST POSITIONS 133, 143
(Lynn M. Morgan & Meredith W. Michaels eds., 1999).





an event scheduled for 1977. The IWY Conference promised to be a
major event, attracting a significant media presence, drawing thou-
sands of delegates and protesters, and proposing to offer a definitive
political account of "what women wanted."8s The National Commission
on the IWY Conference made clear that the Conference would likely
result in an endorsement of reproductive rights and of the ERA.86 Ray
White, the new Executive Director of the NRLC reacted with outrage,
urging members to protest Congress's decision to fund IWY.87
The effects of IWY on the antiabortion movement were striking.
Elizabeth Moore, an antiabortion correspondent, reported that antia-
bortion delegates had been denied admission to all of the major meet-
ings at the conference.88 In response, Nellie Gray of March for Life and
Mildred Jefferson of the NRLC took a prominent part in a pro-family
rally protesting the Conference and the ERA. Jefferson's speech was
particularly telling. As late as 1975, Jefferson, a surgeon, had praised
and expressed sympathy for women "striving for identity and recogni-
tion," arguing simply that abortion was not a solution for women's
problems.89 By 1977, by contrast, she explained to Ebony magazine of
Roe and the women's movement: "We're at odds with everything they
represent.... There isn't anything they talk about that I can support in
any way."9o
A second reason for the marginalization of pro-life moderates
came with the emergence of the New Right and Religious Right in the
late 1970s. Although the Religious Right of the 1970s is primarily asso-
ciated with evangelical Protestantism, the movement attracted con-
servative Catholics, Mormons, and Jews.91 The Religious Right also
unified a variety of Protestant groups that had previously disagreed on
85. For a contemporary take on the IWY and the proposals emerging from it, see Caroline
Bird, National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year, in WHAT WOMEN
WANT: FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES 43, 60 (1979).
86. See DONALD CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE POLITICAL
HISTORY 161 (2007).
87. See Letter from Ray White to Board of Directors (Dec. 10, 1975), in The American Citi-
zens Concerned for Life Papers (Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
88. Elizabeth Moore, Footnotes from the Nation's Capitol (1976), in The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers (Box 10, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
89. See Kathleen Hendrix, Impassioned Argument for Right to Life, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1975,
at Fl.
90. See, e.g., A Fighter for the Right to Life, EBONY MAG., Apr. 1978, at 78, 92.
91. Jerry Falwell, the head of the Moral Majority, a leading Religious Right organization,
stressed the diversity of his own organization and of social conservatives more generally. See Joel
Kotkin, Ready on the Right: Christian Soldiers Are on the March, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1979, at A10.
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issues ranging from abortion to the civil rights movement.92 Historians
point to a number of long- and short-term trends that contributed to
the rise of this form of social conservatism: for example, the end of the
civil rights movement, the rapid demographic growth of populations
naturally attracted to evangelical Christianity, and the migration of a
significant number of Americans to states in the Sunbelt.93
Members of the Religious Right themselves claimed to have been
inspired by important cultural, social, and economic changes that took
place in the 1960s and 1970s. A list offered in the promotional materi-
als put out in 1980 by one organization, the Moral Majority, may be
representative: the Supreme Court had banned school prayer and had
legalized abortion; the women's movement had won influential allies
in criticizing some aspects of the traditional family, and gays and lesbi-
ans had become more visible and more vocal in demanding equal
treatment.94
By the mid-to-late 1970s, the Religious Right had become a politi-
cal force. One influential group, Christian Voice, was founded in 1978
as part of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank.95 By
1979, the organization had 100,000 members and a governing board
that included fourteen members of Congress.96 Headquartered in Pas-
adena, California, Christian Voice had raised as much as $3 million for
the 1980 presidential campaign by the end of summer 1979.97
Described by Falwell as a "coalition capable of steering America
away from liberal, humanist, and secular tendencies," the Moral Major-
ity was also quickly establishing its political influence.98 By December
92. See DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD'S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 5-6 (2010).
There were also differences of opinion on abortion. For example, as early as 1973, both funda-
mentalist groups and the National Association of Evangelicals opposed Roe v. Wade. By contrast,
between 1971 and 1976, the position of the Southern Baptist Conference was that abortion
should be permitted when there was evidence of rape, incest, severe fetal deformity, or a "likeli-
hood of damage to the emotional, mental, [or] physical health of the mother." See id at 115-16.
93. On the history and origins of the Christian Right, see, e.g., CLYDE WILCOX & CARIN ROBINSON,
ONWARD CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS? THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (4th ed. 2011); SARA
DIAMOND, NOT BY POLITICS ALONE: THE ENDURING INFLUENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1998); DARREN
DOCHUK, FROM BIBLE BELT TO SUNBELT: PLAIN-FOLK RELIGION, GRASSROOTS POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF
EVANGELICAL CONSERVATISM (2011).
94. See What Is the Moral Majority?, in The Moral Majority General Materials Collection
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1979, Falwell was reaching an audience of 2.5 million and was raising
$1 million a week in mail contributions.99
Founded in 1979 by former Colgate Palmolive salesman Ed
McAteer, and James Robison, a thirty-six-year-old Southern Baptist
preacher, a third organization, the Religious Roundtable, was focused
on encouraging conservative Christians to become politically in-
volved.oo The group came to include many of the best-known televan-
gelists, including Falwell and Pat Robertson. During the Reagan
Administration, when Christian conservatives angrily protested the
nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to the Court, Ronald Reagan's
White House was obliged to assuage the concerns of Roundtable mem-
bers.1o
Allied with the Religious Right in the later 1970s was another
group sympathetic to the antiabortion movement, the nascent "New
Right," which began as a tight-knit circle of social conservatives in
Washington, D.C. As they described it, leaders of the New Right rose
from the ashes of the Watergate scandal: the result of "impatience with
the shambles of the Nixon-Ford Administration."102 One of the orches-
trators of this movement was long-time political activist Paul Weyrich,
a co-founder of the Heritage Foundation, as well as the Committee for
the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC).1o3 Weyrich's organizations
provided valuable training and money to fledgling New Right causes:
by 1978, the CSFC had raised $400,000 and contributed to the elec-
tions of thirty-one members of Congress.104 While Weyrich provided
political strategy for these groups, Richard Viguerie and his direct-mail
organization offered lobbying and fundraising services. By March
1977, Viguerie employed a staff of 250 and sent an average of 250 mil-
lion pieces of mail to over 10 million Americans.1os
Another potent new potential ally tied to the Religious Right and
the New Right was Beverly LaHaye's Concerned Women for America, a
group founded in 1979 as an alternative to NOW for women who were
99. Glen, supra note 45, at 2142.
100. See CRITCHLOW, supra note 86, at 130, 175-76.
101. See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, Foes ofAbortion Meet with Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1982, at
1.
102. See Barry Sussman, 'New Right' in U.S. Politics May Be Only an Expression of Discontent,
Not Ideology, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1978, at C3.
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opposed to abortion and the ERA.1o6 In the early 1980s, the CWA be-
came the leading pro-life women's group. Beginning at its first national
convention in 1984, the CWA described itself as an alternative to the
women's movement, which in turn was framed as "one of the evils be-
setting America."107 In the mid-1980s, the CWA argued that feminism
did not address the needs of modern women and was, by extension,
irrelevant to American politics. As LaHaye stated in 1986: "NOW's ide-
as are no more popular than the Susan B. Anthony dollar .... The femi-
nist coin came out of circulation because nobody liked it. Well, nobody
likes their unisex, lesbian, radical philosophy, either."o8 The CWA's
message in the period made apparent that there was no room for anti-
abortion feminists like those in groups like the ACCL or FFL.
The antiabortion movement appeared much more likely to be ad-
equately funded and politically influential if it united with social con-
servatives. Partly for this reason, antiabortion activists began
endorsing a number of conservative reforms largely unrelated to Roe
itself. For example, by October 1977, the NRLC had passed a resolution
describing the organization as a religious one, asserting that the "Right
to Life Movement is founded on a belief that God creates life."1o9 The
same month, the organization passed a resolution condemning the ERA
and stating that the true victims of discrimination in the United States
were "preborn children who were denied their right to live."nio As the
Religious Right had become more politically savvy, the NRLC had rede-
fined itself as being both more conservative and more religious.
CONCLUSION
Conventionally, Roe v. Wade is seen to have marginalized moder-
ates on either side of the abortion debate and, in so doing, to have un-
done the kinds of state-level compromise that had been unfolding at
the state level. Because of the dominance of this polarization narrative,
important actors and arguments have largely been lost in contempo-
rary abortion scholarship. Antiabortion moderates were more influen-
tial than is conventionally thought, both in the mainstream movement
106. See BEVERLY LAHAYE, THE NEW SPIRIT-CONTROLLED WOMAN 6 (2005) (describing the found-
ing of Concerned Women for America).
107. See CWA Fights for Conservative Causes, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sept. 18, 1984, at D1.
108. See Beverly LaHaye, Why Feminism No Longer Sells, in THE HERITAGE LECTURES (Mar. 10,
1987).
109. See Resolution (Oct. 7, 1977), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers (Box




and in separate organizations. Because of the impact of these activists,
important compromises remained viable in the years immediately
after Roe, solutions involving contraception, daycare, or pregnancy
discrimination rather than abortion itself. Ultimately, by the early
1980s, these antiabortion moderates were marginalized. However, the
reasons these groups lost influence went far beyond the decision of
Roe itself.
The history of pro-life moderates raises important questions
about leading criticisms of Roe. Scholars criticize the sweep of Roe, the
privacy rationale for the opinion, or the Court's interference with an
unfolding democratic process in part by pointing to the polarization
produced by the opinion. However, at least insofar as antiabortion
moderates were concerned, Roe did not radicalize discussion. To the
extent that the history here offers an example, the history on which
Roe's critics rely is problematic.
As importantly, the history considered here adds new depth to
important scholarship on women of the Right. The richest studies of
this kind tend to focus on women who reject everything associated
with the women's movement and the political left. The stories gathered
here offer a more complete understanding of what it meant in the
1970s to be "pro-woman and pro-life."
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